Representational faithfulness plays a prominent role in FASB's conceptual framework but, the extent to which firms' disclosures are representationally faithful, and the association between representational faithfulness and the decision-usefulness of information are relatively unexplored questions in academic research. We investigate whether a change in segment reporting standards compelled managers to delineate segments for external reporting purposes that more faithfully represent their firms' internal organizational structure. We find support for this hypothesis among single-and multi-segment firms that changed their segment definitions in response to SFAS 131. In contrast, we find no difference in the representational faithfulness of the SFAS 14 disclosures provided by multi-segment change firms, versus no-change firms. Moreover, the no-change firms' SFAS 131 disclosures are significantly less representationally faithful than those of the change firms' disclosures, suggesting continued reticence by some firms to define segments consistent with their internal organizational structure. Finally, we investigate the link between representational faithfulness and the market's ability to predict future cash flows. We document an increase in FERC for firms that increased the representational faithfulness of their segment disclosures.
INTRODUCTION
The qualitative characteristic of representational faithfulness plays a prominent role in FASB's conceptual framework. Recently, the joint FASB-IASB conceptual framework project resulted in new guidance that elevates representational faithfulness to one of two fundamental qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial information; the other is relevance. Despite this prominent role, however, the extent to which firms' disclosures are representationally faithful, and the association between representational faithfulness and the market's ability to predict future cash flows are relatively unexplored questions in academic research. This might be because the underlying economics of transactions and events are often unobservable and difficult to proxy for.
The adoption of SFAS 131, Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related
Information, provides a unique opportunity to provide evidence with respect to these issues. A stated objective of SFAS 131 is to enhance the faithful representation of firms' internal organization of business activities via the management approach to segment disclosures. While the internal organization of business activities is not directly observable, it can be inferred based on strategy and finance literature, which suggests that grouping operations based on industry relatedness achieves operational efficiencies and maximizes firm value. We assume that firms group activities to maximize profits, and accordingly, organize their business operations as suggested by this literature. We define representationally faithful segment disclosures as those that better reflect this organizational design.
We investigate whether, relative to SFAS 14, the management approach in SFAS 131 induces managers to delineate segments for external reporting purposes that more faithfully represent firms' internal organizational structures. 1 We find support for this hypothesis among single-and multi-segment firms that changed their segment definitions in response to SFAS 131. We also find that firms reporting as single-segment firms under SFAS 14, but multi-segment firms under SFAS 131, provide the least representationally faithful SFAS 14 disclosures, but the most representationally faithful SFAS 131
disclosures. This is consistent with critics' claims that such firms took greater advantage of the flexibility in SFAS 14 to provide less representationally faithful disclosure. It is also consistent with monitors, such as auditors, being particularly vigilant in monitoring the adoption of SFAS 131 by such firms.
We also compare the representational faithfulness of the segment disclosures of firms that alter their segment definitions in response to SFAS 131 (i.e. change firms) to those that do not (i.e. no-change firms). We find that single-segment change firms provide marginally less representationally faithful SFAS 14 disclosures than single-segment no-change firms. In contrast, there is no difference in the representational faithfulness of the SFAS 14 disclosures provided by multi-segment change firms, versus no-change firms. Nonetheless, in light of the single-and multi-segment change firms' improved SFAS 131 disclosures, the representational faithfulness of the no-change firms' SFAS 131 disclosures significantly lags behind that of the change firms. These findings imply continued reticence by some firms to define segments consistent with their internal organizational structure.
In addition to examining the extent to which firms' segment disclosures are representationally faithful, we investigate the link between representational faithfulness and the market's ability to predict future cash flows. Our results suggest that greater representational faithfulness enhances the market's ability to predict future cash flows. Specifically, we document an increase in the forward earnings response coefficient (FERC) for firms that increase the representational faithfulness of their segment disclosures.
Our paper contributes to the disclosure literature by assessing the representational faithfulness of firms' disclosures in a large sample setting; demonstrating the use of theory to infer the otherwise unobservable underlying economics of transactions and events; linking the disclosure, strategic management and organization design literatures; introducing measures of operational and strategic relatedness not previously employed in accounting research; examining the extent to which SFAS 131 impacts the representational faithfulness of relevant subsets of firms; and examining the association between representational faithfulness and the market's ability to predict future cash flows.
We believe standard setters will be interested in our evidence of the extent to which the management approach induces firms to provide representationally faithful disclosures, and the association between representational faithfulness and the prediction of cash flows. Analysts and other users might also be interested in our research since it suggests a means for assessing the representational faithfulness of firms' segment disclosures, and provides evidence that more representationally faithful disaggregation provides information that allows users to better assess future cash flows.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we summarize the related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section III describes our research design and empirical proxies. In Section IV, we outline our sample selection procedures and provide descriptive statistics regarding our sample firms. Section V presents the results of our analyses. Finally, Section VI offers a summary of our findings and conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Background

Representational Faithfulness and the Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required the SEC to undertake a study of the U.S. accounting standard setting process, including an investigation of the costs and benefits of concepts-vs. rules-based standards. The SEC concluded that both approaches pose challenges. Concepts-based standards present enforcement challenges, but properly applied should yield more representationally faithful information. In contrast, rules-based standards increase the perceived comparability and consistency of financial information, but encourage transaction structuring to achieve desired financial reporting objectives regardless of the economic substance of the underlying transaction. Ultimately, the SEC concluded that the benefits of concepts-based standards outweigh the costs, and recommended a move to a more concepts-based approach (SEC, 2003) .
The SEC noted, however, that such a move necessitates an improved and consistently applied conceptual framework. Consequently, in October 2004, the FASB and IASB added a conceptual framework project to their joint agenda. In the fall of 2010, this project produced new guidance, which elevates faithful representation to the position of one of two fundamental qualitative characteristics of decision-useful financial reporting information.
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Segment Disclosures under SFAS 14 and SFAS 131
In 1994, the Special Committee on Financial Reporting issued a report identifying five areas of concern with SFAS 14. 3 First, users called for quarterly disclosure of segment information. 4 Second, they were concerned about the limited amount of information disclosed about each segment. Third, users believed that companies were reporting an inadequate number of segments. Fourth, was the inconsistency between firms' segment grouping for purposes of their segment disclosures versus the grouping emphasized elsewhere in the annual report (e.g. MD&A). And finally, users expressed a preference for segmentation that corresponds to internal management reports. The final three issues reflect the then broadly held concern that segment disclosures under SFAS 14 failed to faithfully represent firms' internal organization of business activities into operating units.
The FASB issued SFAS 131 to address these perceived weaknesses. 5 Key objectives of SFAS 131 include increasing the number of reportable segments, the amount of information disclosed about each segment, and the timeliness of the disclosures. But perhaps most importantly, SFAS 131 adopted the "management approach" to define segments, wherein reportable segments are defined based on managements' organization of business activities for purposes of making operating decisions and assessing performance. Accordingly, we believe that the adoption of SFAS 131 provides an interesting opportunity to examine the issue of representational faithfulness, and the association between representational faithfulness and decision-usefulness.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Prior literature finds that the economic consequences of disclosure influence managers' segment definitions under SFAS 14. Studies show that firms facing greater proprietary and/or agency costs obfuscate their segment disclosures (Harris, 1998; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Berger and Hann, 2007) . Hayes and Lundholm (1996) provide a theoretical model that supports the proprietary cost argument. The model predicts that firms are more likely to report activities separately when the results of operations are more alike, and group activities together when their results are more dissimilar. That is, managers prefer to aggregate activities when doing so shields sensitive information from rivals. Interestingly, Hayes and
Lundholm's prediction regarding managers' external reporting behavior contrasts strongly with the prediction from the finance and strategy literature discussed later, that managers aggregate similar activities, and disaggregate dissimilar activities for internal operational purposes.
Existing research also examines the extent to which SFAS 131 achieves some of the objectives noted earlier. The research finds that the number of segments reported and the amount of information provided about each segment increases after SFAS 131 (Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Berger and Hann, 2003) . Ettredge et al. (2006) find an increase in the across segment variability of reported segment profits post SFAS 131, while Street et al. (2000) find that SFAS 131 segment information is more consistent with other information provided in the annual report.
These results show that post-SFAS 131 managers' provide greater information, about a larger number of segments, which is more consistently presented throughout the annual report, but in light of the proprietary and/or agency costs managers perceive with respect to segment disclosures, there is no guarantee that these characteristics parlay into more representationally faithful disclosures. Our study supplements this literature by expressly addressing the issue of representational faithfulness. Our first hypothesis, stated in alternate form is as follows:
H1:
There is a significant increase in the representational faithfulness of segment disclosures following the implementation of SFAS 131. Ettredge et al. (EKSZ 2005) examine the impact of SFAS 131 adoption on the market's ability to predict future earnings. They show that, for firms reporting multiple segments under both disclosure standards, current stock returns are more closely associated with realized future earnings in the post SFAS 131 period. Nonetheless, they document no significant difference between firms that increase the number of segments versus those that do not. Accordingly, EKSZ conclude that the increase in the sensitivity of current stock prices to future earnings is not achieved merely by increasing the number of segments; instead something else is at play. We supplement EKSZ's finding by exploring whether greater representational faithfulness contributes to the explanation for the market's enhanced ability to predict future earnings.
If more representationally faithful disclosures allow market participants to better predict future earnings, current stock returns should be more closely associated with realized future earnings. This yields our second hypothesis, stated below in alternate form.
H2:
An increase in representational faithfulness is associated with an increase in the market's ability to predict future earnings.
III. EMPIRICAL PROXIES AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Proxies for Representational Faithfulness Based on Industry Relatedness
The strategic management literature suggests that firms' diversification decisions reflect a tradeoff between "the threat of losing focus and the opportunity to grow and exploit synergies" (Adner and Zemsky 2006) . Baiman et al. (1995) find that management task expertise (derived from industry relatedness), and the relative importance of a business unit to the firm, are important determinants of organizational design. Rumelt (1974) concludes that in related industries firms are better able to exploit resources and cross-utilize technical and managerial skills, and knowledge. Nayyar (1993) shows that, in related industries, firms establish and maintain their reputation more easily, and enjoy economies of scale and scope. Finally, Adner and Zemsky (2006) model the relation between diversification and firm performance, and conclude that greater industry relatedness increases the likelihood that diversification is profitable.
Related literature in finance finds that greater focus, or a move to divest unrelated operations, is associated with higher stock returns (Comment and Jarrell, 1995) . Berger and Ofek (1995) find that operating in related industries mitigates the "diversification discount" (i.e. the negative market implications of corporate diversification). More recently, Villalonga (2004) provides evidence of a premium to related diversification and a discount to unrelated diversification using data from the Business Information Tracking Series, a census database. Further, research examining acquisitions and subsequent divestitures finds that firms are far more likely to divest unrelated acquisitions than related acquisitions (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992) and that post-merger performance is higher when the target and acquiring firms share a high level of industry overlap (Healy et al., 1992) .
This literature demonstrates that structuring operations to capitalize on industry relatedness enhances firm value via operational and strategic efficiencies. We assume that managers act to maximize firm value, and rely on this finding to infer that managers group operations related by industry for internal operating purposes. We examine managers' grouping of operations for external reporting purposes and deem segment disclosures to be more representationally faithful when the operations grouped for external reporting purposes are characterized by greater industry relatedness.
Industry Classification Systems
The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system was developed by the U.S. Government to facilitate consistency in the presentation of statistical data. The system defines industries based on the principal products or services produced. Building on this system, Fama and French (FF, 1997) In contrast, BLO find that the GICS classification dominates SIC and NAIC codes, but BLO's conclusion is based on a comparison of a finer partitioning of GICS codes (6-digit codes) to a grosser partitioning of SIC codes (2-digit codes) and NAIC codes (3-digit codes). Consequently, whether the GICS system dominates these alternatives, holding the fineness of the partitioning constant, is an open question. Moreover, GICS codes are not readily available at the firm level, and are not available at the segment level. As a result, GICS codes are rarely employed in academic research, and their use is not feasible in this study because our analyses are conducted at the segment level.
All of our representational faithfulness proxies are based on industry membership as determined by the primary and secondary SIC or NAIC codes Compustat assigns to firms' segments. Compustat assigns a primary and, if applicable, secondary industry code, to each segment based on information in the firm's 10-k or annual report. For single-activity segments, Compustat assigns a primary industry code but no secondary industry code because a single industry code fully describes the activities of the segment as reported in the company's footnote. 6 Single-activity segments are important to our analyses since, by definition, they capture "perfectly" related activities. Since many of our relatedness measures require both primary and secondary industry codes, we set the secondary industry code equal to the primary industry code for all single-activity segments. We apply this procedure to the data in the pre-and post-SFAS 131 periods. We believe our procedure captures the economics of the single-activity segments, and a
Compustat representative we contacted agreed that equating the secondary industry code to the primary industry code is appropriate in these cases.
Our measures of industry relatedness focus on several different aspects of industry relatedness including horizontal integration, strategic choice, competitive environment, growth opportunities, and vertical integration. We provide details of each of our measures in the following paragraphs.
Horizontal Integration (SameFF)
Our first relatedness measure is based on the Fama French (FF) industry groupings. 7 Specifically, we set SameFF equal to one if a segment's primary and secondary SIC codes belong to the same FF industry, and zero otherwise. Accordingly, SameFF is increasing in industry relatedness.
Strategic Choice (PMATpf)
Selling and Stickney (SS, 1989) show that industries with high fixed costs and entry barriers tend to have higher profit margin and lower asset turnover consistent with a differentiation strategy. In contrast, industries with low capital intensity and commodity-like products tend to have lower profit margin and higher asset turnover indicative of a cost leadership strategy. Accordingly, SS demonstrate a link between firms' strategic choices and a negative correlation between asset turnover and profit margin.
Using data from the Compustat population of single-segment firms, we compute industry profit margin and asset turnover ratios for 1990 through 1995. 8 We define industry in terms of 2-digit NAIC code because doing so yields the largest negative correlation between profit margin and asset turnover.
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Using quintile cutoffs of industry profit margin and asset turnover, respectively, we define five "profit margin" portfolios, and five "asset turnover" portfolios, with portfolio 1 (5) containing industries with the 7 See Appendix A for a cross-reference of the Fama and French classification system to SIC codes. 8 We compute profit margin as the ratio of operating profit after depreciation (Compustat data item #178) to Sales (data item #12), and asset turnover as the ratio of Sales to average total assets (data item #6). For purposes of these computations, we eliminate firms with assets less than zero, and sales less than $20 million. We also require a minimum of 10 firms in each industry category. 9 We examined several different definitions of "industry" including 1-, 2-, and 3-digit SIC codes, and 2-, 3-, and 4-digit NAIC. Since Stickney and Spelling link business strategy to a negative correlation between asset turnover and profit margin we "let the data speak" and define industry based on the definition that yields the largest negative correlation between industry profit margin and asset turnover ratios.
lowest (highest) values of each ratio. We then identify twenty-five "strategy" portfolios based on combinations of profit margin and asset turnover portfolios. For example, industries with the highest profit margin and lowest asset turnover are identified as strategy portfolio (5, 1). PMATpf is one if a segment's primary and secondary 2-digit NAIC codes belong to the same strategy portfolio, and zero otherwise. PMATpf is increasing in industry relatedness.
Competitive Environment (Compdiff)
Compdiff is our measure of industry relatedness based on similarity in competitive environment.
Harris's (1998) speed of abnormal positive profit adjustment (β 2j ) measures the persistence of return on assets (ROA) above the industry norm and ranges from zero to one. 10 A significant positive β 2j suggests that in the short-term competitors cannot mimic the firm's performance and dispel its competitive advantage. Accordingly, a larger β 2j implies less competition.
Consistent with prior research, we estimate β 2j via equation (1) for each industry defined by 3-digit SIC code using pooled cross-sectional time-series data from 1996 -1998 for all Compustat firms with non-zero sales.
Where:
X ijt = the difference between firm i's return on assets and the mean return on assets for industry j in year t; D n = 1 if X ijt-1 is less than or equal to 0, and 0 otherwise; and D p = 1 if X ijt-1 is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise.
We define Compdiff as the absolute value of the difference between β 2j for the segment's primary and secondary industries based on 3-digit SIC codes. Compdiff is decreasing in industry relatedness.
Growth Opportunities (MBAdiff)
MBAdiff is our measure of industry relatedness based on similarity in growth opportunities. The opportunity to generate returns above the required rate of return is an important business objective, which affects firm strategy and organizational design. Adam and Goyal (2006) evaluate four commonly used proxies for growth opportunities, and conclude that the market-to-book asset (MBA) ratio is the best proxy among those they examine. Thus, we measure growth opportunities using MBA. We follow Gaver and Gaver's (2003) approach and compute MBA as the book value of total assets less the book value of common equity plus market value of common equity, divided by the book value of total assets.
Using data surrounding the regulatory change, 1996-1998, we estimate the mean value of MBA for each industry based on 3-digit SIC codes for the Compustat population of firms. We define MBAdiff as the absolute value of the difference between ΜΒΑ for the segment's primary and secondary industries.
MBAdiff is decreasing in industry relatedness.
Vertical Integration (Vrel)
The possibility that some firms are vertically integrated is particularly relevant to our study because among SFAS 131's many changes is a change in the reporting requirements for vertically integrated operations. SFAS 14 did not require disclosure of vertically integrated operations because it focused on products and services sold to unaffiliated customers. SFAS 131 removes this exception, and explicitly includes vertically integrated operations in the definition of an operating segment.
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Following prior research (Fan and Lang, 2000; Schoar, 2002; Shahrur, 2005; Kale and Shahrur, 2007) , we derive our proxy for vertical relatedness (Vrel) from the Use tables of the benchmark inputoutput accounts for the U.S. economy. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), a division of the U.S. department of Commerce, publishes the Use tables annually. We use data from the 1997 table because it is closest to our sample period. The Use tables report the dollar value of commodity flows between pairs of industries and the total production of each industry.
12 For each industry pair, i and j, the table reports the dollar value of industry i's output that industry j consumed in producing its output.
Fan and Lang (2000) divide the dollar value of industry i's output consumed by industry j by the dollar value of industry j's output to obtain a ij , the percent of industry j's total output supplied by industry 11 SFAS 131, ¶79. 12 Industry is defined based on NAIC code.
i. Similarly, a ji measures the percent of industry i's total output supplied by industry j. Following Fan and Lang, we average these two ratios to measure the extent of vertical integration for pairs of industries, where the pairs are defined by the primary and secondary industry SIC codes. Vrel is increasing in relatedness since vertical integration is greater when a larger percentage of one industry's output is supplied by another industry.
Proxy for Market's Ability to Predict Future Earnings (FERC)
The forward earnings response coefficient (FERC) captures the relation between current period returns and next year's earnings, controlling for information in current and past earnings and next year's returns. Consistent with Ettredege et al. (2005) we use the FERC model developed in Collins et al. (1994) , which regresses current period returns onto past, current, and future earnings. Collins et al.
include future returns as a control variable in the regression to mitigate bias arising from the use of realized future earnings in the model to proxy for expected future earnings. The FERC is b 3 , the coefficient on future earnings, estimated via the following regression equation.
R t is the annual stock return for year t, measured over the 12 months ending three months after the firm's fiscal year end, E t-1 is the income available to common shareholders (Compustat variable IBCOM) in year t-1 deflated by the market value of equity three months after the year t-1 fiscal year end, E t is the income available to common shareholders (Compustat variable IBCOM) in year t deflated by the market value of equity three months after the year t fiscal year end, E t+1 is the income available to common shareholders (Compustat variable IBCOM) in year t+1 deflated by the market value of equity three months after the year t+1 fiscal year end, R t+1 is the annual stock return for year t+1.
Research Design
Test of H1
H1 predicts a significant increase in the representational faithfulness of firms' segment disclosures following the adoption of SFAS 131. We deem segment disclosures to be more representationally faithful when the operations grouped together for segment reporting purposes are characterized by greater industry relatedness. Accordingly, our primary tests of H1 are based on univariate tests of a significant increase in SameFF, PMATpf, and Vrel, and a significant decrease in Compdiff and MBAdiff. We also undertake a multivariate analysis of the change in relatedness after controlling for the change in the number of segments. This analysis investigates whether our results are incremental to existing findings regarding the impact of SFAS 131 on the number of segments, and addresses the concern that relatedness is a mechanical function of the number of segments.
We examine the extent to which the change in representational faithfulness is significant after controlling for the change in the number of segments, the number of segments under SFAS 14, and the size of the firm. Moreover, we examine the extent to which the change in representational faithfulness is associated with the level of representational faithfulness under SFAS 14. If SFAS 131 successfully induces firms to provide more representationally faithful segment disclosures, the improvement will be greater for firms with less representationally faithful disclosures under SFAS 14. The regression equation we estimate to test these predictions is shown below. 
Test of H2
H2 predicts that an increase in representational faithfulness is associated with an increase in the market's ability to predict future earnings. Using SameFF we classify the SFAS 14 and SFAS 131 segment disclosures of each multi-segment firm that changed their segment disclosures in response to SFAS 131 as representationally faithful (non-representationally faithful), if its weighted (by segment sales) average value of SameFF exceeds (falls below) 0.76. We use 0.76 as our cutoff because this is the highest mean value SameFF attains in any of the periods and sample partitions we examine. 13 We then partition our sample into four groups. We use the FERC model (equation (2)) augmented by an indicator variable (POST) to test H2.
The coefficient on POST*E t+1 (i.e. b 8 ) captures the change in the magnitude of FERC between the SFAS 14 and SFAS 131.
Post is equal to zero in the SFAS 14 period and one in the SFAS 131 period. All other variables are defined as above.
We estimate equation (4) 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Sample Construction
We collect data for all firms on the Compustat segment file the year of SFAS 131 adoption, and the prior year. December year-end firms adopted SFAS 131 in 1998. For these firms, 1997 is the prior year, and 1998 is the year of adoption. Non-December year-end firms adopted SFAS 131 in 1999, such that 1998 and 1999 are the prior and adoption years, respectively, for these firms. This yields 8,041 firms with 24,885 business segments. We eliminate 995 firms with 5,827 segments because they altered their segment definitions as the result of a merger, acquisition, or divestiture in the adoption year. 14 We also eliminate 631 firms (with 1,568 segments) because they reported zero assets and our market-to-book asset ratio is undefined for such firms. We also remove segments (though not necessarily entire firms) if they have negative sales or no primary SIC code because such "segments" often represent corporate transfers or eliminations. This reduces our sample by 25 firms and 487 segments. Finally, firms must have at least one segment observation in the SFAS 14 and SFAS 131 periods to remain in the sample. This requirement reduces our sample by 2,619 firms and 5,578 segments. Our final sample consists of 3,771 14 We use the Compustat footnote for Sales (data #12) to identify firms with mergers and acquisitions. If the footnote indicates that the current year sales data includes a merger or acquisition, we remove the firm from the sample. To identify divestitures, we review the notes of annual 10-k reports of firms reporting a decrease in the number of segments in the period after the adoption of SFAS 131. Although this follows convention in related literature (Street et al. 2000; Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Hann, 2003 and 2007) , this screening mechanism is criticized for its potential elimination of firms whose actual structure changed precisely because of the new regulation (Piotroski, 2003) . For example, firms with poorly performing business units might divest such units to avoid potential monitoring following the exposure of poor performing operations by SFAS 131. In the context of our research question, eliminating these firms biases against finding a significant change in segment definitions that is associated with organizational design.
unique firms that report 4,885 segments under SFAS 14 and 6,540 segments under SFAS 131. Table 1 summarizes our sample selection process.
Insert Table 1 here.
Of the firms in our final sample 29% (1,081 change firms) changed their segment definitions in response to SFAS 131, whereas 71% (2,690 no-change firms) did not. 15 Of the 1,081 change firm, 73%
(785 firms) report a single segment under SFAS 14, and multiple segments under SFAS 131. We use "change firm single_multi" to refer to this group of firms. The remaining 27% (296 firms) report multiple segments in both reporting regimes, but changed some of their segment definitions upon adoption of SFAS 131. We use "change firm multi_multi" to refer to this subset. Among the no-change firms, 87%
(2,344 firms) report a single segment, whereas the remaining 13% (346 firms) report multiple segments.
We refer to these as the "no-change single segment" and "no-change multi segment" samples, respectively. to 48% under SFAS 14. Nonetheless, the multi-segment no-change firms report fewer segments than the multi-segment change firms before and after SFAS 131. Slightly more than 60% of the multi-segment nochange firms report only two segments as compared to 48% of the multi-segment change firms before SFAS 131, and 15.9% after.
Descriptive Statistics
15
We identify change firms using Compustat's segment identifier (SID). When, for any reason, a listed segment is not comparable to segment listed in the prior year, Compustat assigns a new SID to the segment. We initially classify as a change firm each firm with a new SID, but as noted in our sample selection procedures, we remove firms with mergers, acquisitions, or divestitures to isolate firms for whom SFAS 131 unequivocally motivated the change in segment disclosure. Table 2 gives the distribution of change firms by the direction of the change in the representational faithfulness of their disclosures using two of our industry relatedness measures (SameFF and Vrel). The percentage of firms with an increase (decrease) in representational faithfulness is 45% (30%) based on SameFF. The corresponding figures based on Vrel are 52% and 43%, respectively. In contrast, a much larger proportion of the change firms (96% or 1,031 of 1,081 firms) increased the number of segments they report. These data imply that observing an increase in the number of segments might not be sufficient to assume an increase in the representational faithfulness of segment disclosure.
Panel D of
Insert Table 2 here. Table 3 provides firm-level descriptive statistics for the four subsamples the year prior to, and the year of adoption of SFAS 131. Panels A and B provide data for the change firm single_multi and multi_multi subsamples, respectively, while panels C and D provide data for the no-change single and multi samples.
Insert Table 3 here.
All of our firm size variables (total assets, total sales and MVE) indicate subsamples skewed toward larger firms. Indeed, our sample firms tend to be larger than the population of firms on Compustat.
In 1998, the SFAS 131 adoption year for the majority of our firms, median total sales for firms in the Compustat population is $79 million. In our data set, median total sales exceed this figure for all but the no-change single segment firms. Nonetheless, our subsamples differ in terms of firm size. The largest firms belong to the change firm multi-multi subsample with median total sales of $621 million in the SFAS 131 adoption year. Second largest, with median total sales of $198 million, is the no-change firm multi group, followed by the change firm single-multi subset (median total sales of $134 million), and finally the no-change single segment firms (median total sales of $42 million). Profitability, as measured by ROA, is stable over the sample period. Median ROA for both subsamples of change firms is constant at 3%. The no-change single segment firms appear slightly less profitable (ROA of 2%), whereas the nochange multi-segment firms appear slightly more profitable (ROA of 4%). Table 4 , Panel A provides correlations among our measures of industry relatedness as well as the number of segments reported by the firm. 16 The correlations among the variables in the final SFAS 14 year are presented below the diagonal. The statistics above the diagonal pertain the SFAS 131 adoption year.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Correlation Analysis Pertaining to H1
Insert Table 4 here.
There is a high (68%) correlation between SameFF and PMATpf suggesting that these measures capture similar aspects of industry relatedness. In contrast, the correlation between these variables and Vrel, Compdiff and MBAdiff is more modest, as is the correlation among the latter three variables. This implies that Vrel, Compdiff, and MBAdiff capture somewhat different aspects of industry relatedness.
Finally, the correlation between the industry relatedness measures and the number of segments is less than 20%, indicating that variation in the industry relatedness measures is not subsumed by variation in the number of segments. Each of the changes is significant using mean or median tests. In addition, the change in mean Comp_diff Table 6 presents our results of estimating regression equation (3). In both models the intercept is significant and positive. This provides evidence of a significant increase in representational faithfulness following SFAS 131 adoption after controlling for the change in the number of segments, the number of SFAS 14 segments reported, and firm size. Moreover, the significant positive coefficient on
Multivariate Test Results Pertaining to H1
Pre131_MBAdiff in both models confirms our prediction that the increase in representational faithfulness is greater for firms with less representationally faithful SFAS 14 disclosures. Pre131_Compdiff is not statistically significant, but since it is highly correlated with Pre131_MBAdiff (0.71, see Table 4 , Panel B), this is not surprising. The coefficient on ΔSEGN is not statistically significant, which demonstrates that our findings are incremental to prior literature that documents an increase in the number of segments following the adoption of SFAS 131. Finally, the significant negative coefficients on Pre131_SEGN and
FSize confirms that the increase in representational faithfulness is greater for firms that lumped their operation into fewer SFAS 14 segments, and smaller firms.
Insert Table 6 here.
In summary, the results of our analyses provide support for H1, that SFAS 131 succeeded in increasing the representational faithfulness of segment disclosures. The increase in representational faithfulness is greatest for firms that report as single segment firms under SFAS 14, but multiple segment firms under SFAS 131, and for firms with less representationally faithful SFAS 14 disclosures. Moreover, these findings are not explained by the change in the number of segments. This supports our contention that merely increasing in the number of segments is not a substitute for increasing the representational faithfulness of segment disclosures. Table 7 reports the results of our tests of our second hypothesis that an increase in representational faithfulness is associated with an increase in the market's ability to predict future earnings. We estimate equation (4) Insert Table 7 here.
Test Results Pertaining to H2
The results of our analysis provide support for H2. First, consistent with expectations, we find no change in FERC for firms that did not alter the representational faithfulness of their disclosures (i.e. 
Comparison of Change to No-change Firms
To gain further understanding of firms' segment reporting strategies, we compare the representational faithfulness of the change and no-change firms under SFAS 14 and SFAS 131. We present these results in Table 8 .
Insert Table 8 here.
Panel A compares the change firm single_multi subsample to the no-change multi-segment and single-segment firms, in the SFAS 14 period. The firms reporting a single-segment under SFAS 14, but multiple segments under SFAS 131, provided significantly less representationally faithful segment disclosures than either the single-or the multi-segment no-change firms. For example, on average, 54% of the operations they combined into a segment belonged to the same Fama-French industry, compared to 59% for the no-change single segment firms, and 66% for the no-change multi-segment firms. This pattern generally holds for our other measures of representational faithfulness, and provides further evidence that these firms took greater advantage of the flexibility in SFAS 14 to "hide" certain operations perhaps due to proprietary, agency or other costs of disclosure.
Panel B presents statistics for the same subsamples of firms in the SFAS 131 period. Notably, the firms reporting a single-segment under SFAS 14, but multiple segments under SFAS 131 provide significantly more representationally faithful segment disclosures than either subset of no-change firms.
For example, following the adoption of SFAS 131, 76% of the operations combined into the same segment by the single_multi change firms belonged to the same Fama-French industry group, while these statistics remain at 59% and 66% for the single-and multi-no-change firms, respectively. These results, combined with those in Table 5 , indicate that the firms taking the greatest advantage of SFAS 14 to provide the least representationally faithful disclosures provide the most representationally faithful SFAS 131 segment disclosures relative to all the other subsets of firms we examine. The results presented in Panel C and D suggest that there is continued reticence on the part of some firms that did not change their segment definitions in response to SFAS 131 to continue to define segments, which on average, are less consistent with the firm's internal organizational structure.
Supplementary Test for a Decrease in Across-Segment Industry Relatedness
Our primary tests use within-segment industry relatedness to proxy for representational faithfulness. In this section, we adopt a different approach by defining representational faithfulness in terms of across-segment industry unrelatedness. If managers group operations with common economic characteristics into segments, then we should observe an increase in across-segment diversity of competitive environments and growth opportunities. To capture this, we compute the magnitude of the difference between the maximum and minimum values of the competition (growth) measures assigned to a given firm's segments based on primary SIC code. Comp_range (MBA_range) increases as the competitive environments (growth opportunities) of distinct segments become more diverse. Thus, an increase in these metric is consistent with an increase in across-segment diversity and provides support for H2. 18 Mean (median) Comp_range increases from 1.69 to 2.09 (0.11 to 0.14), but only the median increase is statistically significant. Mean (median) MBA_range increases from 2.45 to 3.66 (1.00 to 1.37), but again, only the median increase is statistically significant. Thus, at least at the median, these results provide additional support for our conclusion that the representational faithfulness of segment disclosures increased following the adoption of SFAS 131.
Insert Table 9 here.
Supplementary Analysis of Restated Segment Disclosures
To provide support for the validity of our proxies for representational faithfulness we examine 25 firms required by the SEC to restate their segment disclosures between 2002 and 2005 because their disclosures failed to comply with SFAS 131. We compute the average of SameFF across segments using both the originally reported segment definitions and the restated segment definitions. We expect to observe an increase in SameFF after restatement if this proxy captures the representational faithfulness of firms' segment disclosures.
The mean SameFF for the originally reported segments is 0.57, while after restatement it is 0.66. Further, the average increase in SameFF is 0.087, which is significantly positive with a t-statistic of 2.08. This is consistent with an increase in the representational faithfulness of these firms' disclosures after SEC intervention. This finding provides support for the construct validity of this proxy. Currently, we have analyzed data only for the variable SameFF, but future drafts of the paper will examine our other proxies.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Critics charge that managers used the latitude extended by SFAS 14 to present segment disclosures that did not faithfully represent their internal organizational structures. The FASB addressed this criticism by prescribing the management approach to segment disaggregation via SFAS 131. Our study provides evidence on the extent to which FASB's effort was successful, and the impact of the resulting change in representational faithfulness on the market's ability to predict cash flows.
We document an increase in the representational faithfulness of segment disclosures among single-and multi-segment firms that altered their segment definitions in response to SFAS 131. Further, the increase is greatest for firms with less representationally faithful SFAS 14 disclosures. Thus, we provide large sample evidence consistent with the management approach leading to segment definitions that are more representationally faithful.
We also find that firms reporting as single-segment firms under SFAS 14 but multi-segment firms under SFAS 131 provided the least representationally faithful SFAS 14 disclosures, but the most representationally faithful SFAS 131 disclosures. This finding is consistent with the criticism that single segment firms took greater advantage of the flexibility in SFAS 14, and with our hypothesis that SFAS 131 succeeded in improving these firms' disclosures.
Nonetheless, we find continued reticence by some firms to define segments consistent with their internal organizational structure. Specifically, when we compare the representational faithfulness of the segment disclosures of multi-segment firms that altered their segment definitions in response to SFAS 131 (change firms) to those that did not (no change firms) we find no difference between their SFAS 14 disclosures. Thus, it is not the case that the no change firms provided more representationally faithful disclosure under SFAS 14. If they had provided more representationally faithful SFAS 14 disclosures, this might have explained their decision not to alter their segment definitions. Moreover, under SFAS 131 the multi-segment change firms now provide significantly more representationally faithful disclosures than the no change multi-segment firms. Consequently, the representational faithfulness of the no change firms' SFAS 131 disclosures lags significantly behind that of the other firms. Future research might investigate the factors (e.g. proprietary costs, agency costs, etc.) associated with this behavior.
To summarize, under SFAS 14 we find that in terms of representational faithfulness, the multisegment change and no-change firms tied for first, the no-change single segment firms' disclosures ranked in the middle, and the single-segment change firms' disclosures ranked last. In contrast, after SFAS 131, the single-segment change firms' disclosures are now the most representationally faithful, the multi-segment change firms' disclosures are next best, followed by the multi-segment no-change firms, and finally, the no-change single segment firms.
We also document an increase in FERC for firms with an increase in the representational faithfulness of their SFAS 131 segment disclosures. This is only true for firms that switched from the non-faithful to the faithful category. Further, for all firms that did not change the representational faithfulness of their disclosures in the SFAS 131 period, we document no change in FERC.
Overall, our evidence provides support for the conclusion that the management approach to segment definitions resulted in disclosures that more faithfully represent firms' internal organizational structures. This is important as both the FASB and the IASB continue to apply the management approach in new standards. Further, we document that more representationally faithful disclosures improve market participants' ability to predict future earnings and cash flows. SameFF is an indicator variable assigned a 1 if the segment's primary and secondary SIC codes are in the same Fama-French industry; zero otherwise. Change in FF is the change in the weighted average values for SameFF across segments after adoption of SFAS 131. PMATpf is an indicator variable assigned a 1 if the segment's primary and secondary 2 digit NAIC codes are in the same strategy portfolio as determined by profit margin and asset turnover quintiles; zero otherwise. Change in PMATpf is the change in the weighted average values for PMATpf after adoption of SFAS 131. Vrel is the average input transfers between the segment's primary and secondary SICs based on the Input-Output accounts for the US economy. Compdiff is the absolute value of the difference in the speed of abnormal profit adjustment for the segment's primary and secondary SICs. Pre131_Compdiff is the weighted average across segments of Compdiff in the Pre SFAS 131 period. MBAdiff is the absolute value of the difference between growth opportunities measured as market-to-book assets of the segment's primary and secondary SICs. Pre 131_MBAdiff is weighted average across segments of MBAdiff in the Pre SFAS 131 period. SEGN is the number of reported segments. ΔSEGN is the change in the number of segments after SFAS 131. Pre131_SEGN is the number of segments in the Pre SFAS 131 period. LSize is the natural log of the market value of common equity. *, **, *** indicates significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The sample consists of 296 multi_multi change firms with stock return data from 1995 to 2000. Firms are classified as representationally faithful (RF) disclosers if the value of SameFF exceeds 0.76 and non-representationally faithful (non-RF) disclosers if the value of SameFF is less than 0.76. Rt is the annual stock return for year t, measured over the 12 months ending three months after the firm's fiscal year end, Et is the income available to common shareholders in year t deflated by the market value of equity three months after the year t fiscal year end, Post is equal to zero in the pre-SFAS 131 period and one in the post period.
Table 8
Comparison of change firms to no-change firms in the pre and post period. See Table 3 for sample definitions and Table 4 for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicates significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Comp_range is the absolute value of the difference between the maximum and minimum measures of the abnormal speed of profit adjustment based on the primary SIC codes assigned to firm's segments. MBA_range is the absolute value of the difference between the maximum and minimum measures of the market-to-book assets measure of growth opportunities based on the primary SIC codes assigned to firms' segments. Fama-French (1997) 2047-2047,2391-2392,2510-2519,2590-2599,2840-2844,3160-3199 , 3229-3231, 3260-3260, 3262-3263, 3269-3269,3630-3639,3750-3751, 3800-3800,3860-3879, 3910-3919, 3960-3961,3991-3991,3995- -0899,2400-2439,2450-2459,2490-2499,2950-2952,3200-3219 , 3240-3259,3261-3261,3264-3264,3270-3299,3420-3442,3446-3452 , 3490-3499,3996- 
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